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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Kim Yuracko’s paper, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: 
Toward a More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 
offers an exploration of judicial reasoning in gender discrimination 
cases.1  The paper claims that distinctions developed under Title VII 
jurisprudence cannot be explained solely through a liberal paradigm.  
Rather, analyzing the motivation of judges in reaching their decisions, 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  LL.M. 2000, Harvard 
University; LL.B. 1998, Tel-Aviv University.  I thank Professor Larry Alexander for 
inviting me to the “Rights and Wrongs of Discrimination” symposium and for his 
extensive and invaluable comments on early drafts. 
 1. Kim Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More 
Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 
(2006). 




primarily in those cases involving the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) exception and sex stereotyping, Yuracko detects a value driven, 
rather than value neutral, adjudicative assessment of the employment in 
question.  She finds that a “more controversial and covert set of values” 
operates in the background, rendering some claims of discrimination 
successful while rejecting others.2  Yuracko consequently argues that 
there is no way to understand the distinctions that have developed within 
BFOQ and sex stereotyping cases through liberal models of equality.3  
Instead, Yuracko finds that existing case law categories are more 
accurately understood as shaped by perfectionist ideals, which inform 
judges on good life pursuits and values, such as autonomy, and other 
less worthy pursuits, such as the commodification of sex and sexual 
expression.4
Yuracko offers an interesting perspective in analyzing Title VII 
jurisprudence.  The paper uncovers tensions in the case law and offers 
excellent insights into the types of judgments that occur in a broad range 
of antidiscrimination cases.  Building on her previous work, Yuracko 
continues to influence the field of antidiscrimination law and gender 
equity theories.5  Her article helps explain the underlying normative 
theories that currently shape the scope of antidiscrimination protection.  
In the following sections, I offer a few reactions to Yuracko’s paper.  
Most basically, I argue that Yuracko both under-describes the power of 
existing liberal models and overstates the coherence of the alternative 
theory, perfectionism, in explaining recent developments in antidiscrimination 
law.  I also claim that the regulation of sexuality should be understood 
simultaneously as presenting a unique case of regulating social relations 
and as merely one example of basic contradictions in contemporary legal 
thought. 
I make three observations on Yuracko’s thesis to explain these ideas.  
First, in Part II, I argue that it is possible to explain the case law 
distinctions between various categories of BFOQ claims within the 
liberal model of antidiscrimination.  Specifically, I turn to a more robust 
analysis of the antisubordination paradigm than Yuracko describes in her 
paper.  I argue that we should consider the dangers of under-inclusion in 
one sector as the result of structural inequalities across the workforce.  
 2. Id. at 858. 
 3. Id. at 866-67. 
 4. Id. at 867-71. 
 5. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST 
VALUES (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko, 
Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 167 (2004). 
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Because of the need to take a more macro approach in addressing the 
effects of discrimination on the market at large, I also argue that as a 
matter of policy, the courts are often not best situated institutionally to 
promote labor market gender equality.  In particular, discrimination that 
stems from disparate impact, which requires a macro understanding of 
the current market, past wrongs, and the ongoing effects of social group 
hierarchies, would benefit from a more active administrative agency 
rather than a court-focused process.  While Yuracko and many other 
commentators equate antidiscrimination regulation with adjudication,6 I 
argue that it is desirable to allow the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) a greater role than it currently plays in the 
administration of antidiscrimination law. 
Second, in Part III, I argue that although it is true that court decisions 
on the regulation of sexuality are pervasively value driven, Yuracko’s 
turn to perfectionist theories of human development oversimplifies the 
range of values and motivations that are in play.  Here my disagreement 
with Yuracko is that I urge a more complex and historical look at the 
forces that trigger the regulation of sexuality at work.  While some 
regulatory impulses toward desexualizing the workplace may be based 
on ideas of good human life and noncommodification of intimate 
relations, there is a range of competing sets of values that have also had 
a pervasive effect on the regulation of sexuality.  These include the 
managerial values of control and hierarchy, which are generally aligned 
with a Taylorist scientific management theory that understands sexual 
expression by workers as a threat to management’s power over production.7  
Furthermore, the regulation of sexuality must be understood in the 
context of broader social struggles, where nonconformity with social 
conventions is frequently configured as a threat to order and existing 
class distinctions.  I will further describe how this interplay between 
perfectionist and Taylorist ideals of human production has ironically 
created an alignment between judge-made decisions and voluntary 
practices of firms, both eager to desexualize the workplace. 
 6. On the focus of rights litigation in the context of antidiscrimination policy, see 
generally Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 405 (2006); Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in Labour Market Policies, 
book chapter forthcoming in THE INTERSECTION OF RIGHTS AND REGULATION (Brownen 
Morgan ed., Ashgate Press).
 7. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2072-73 (2003). 




The unstable alliance between Taylorist and perfectionist values in the 
regulation of sexual behavior in the labor market relates to other deep 
tensions in our commitments to gender equality and, more generally, to 
the promotion of liberal values.  Consequently, Parts III and IV provide 
somewhat conflicting observations.  I argue that there is something unique 
about the regulation of sexuality that invokes value driven judgments in 
adjudication.  At the same time, I explore how sexual regulation is 
merely one symptom of basic difficulties in the implementation of 
liberal rights in concrete cases.  Because sex is deeply coded with social 
meaning and sexuality is always about more than just titillation, I assert 
that value judgments about the quality of human interaction are 
inevitable in Title VII’s implementation.  In Part IV, however, I argue 
that the case of antidiscrimination is merely one salient example of the 
ways in which liberalism in action—whether we are debating the scope 
of free speech or associational rights, equal opportunity or access to 
social services—is fraught with hard distinctions, competing commitments, 
and inevitable contradictions. 
II.  SERVING SEX STRAIGHT-UP: BFOQ, THE COWORKER MODEL,                
AND STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION 
The defense of BFOQ is the most direct exception to Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination in employment.8  Title VII allows employers 
to explicitly disqualify certain classes of applicants when such exclusion 
is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular 
business.”9  The defense exists in Title VII in the context of gender, 
national origin, and religion.  A parallel defense also appears in the 
context of age under the ADEA.  Race is notably excluded from the 
exception, expressing the legislature’s belief that race can never serve 
as a legitimate classification that is essential to the operation of a 
business.  In the case law, several categories of permissible BFOQ defenses 
have developed.  The most notable categories are privacy and safety.  
For example, courts have accepted a BFOQ exception for hospitals 
hiring nurses on the basis of gender in order to accommodate the privacy 
interests of patients.10  Similarly, some courts have recognized a BFOQ 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 10. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-35 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-54 (D. Del 1978) aff’d, 
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that privacy interests of residents allowed a 
nursing home to assign only female nursing aids to female residents).  But see Spragg v. 
Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (refusing to grant BFOQ for 
assignment of male home health aides to male patients only, despite female residents’ 
privacy interests). 
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claim in the context of prison security, where the employer argued that 
“[t]he employee’s very womanhood would thus directly undermine her 
capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional 
counselor’s responsibility.”11  Even in these contexts, courts have been 
split in their degree of acceptance of the privacy and security needs of 
third parties which justify a BFOQ exception.12  Moreover, when the 
safety interests pertain to the workers themselves, courts have generally 
rejected a BFOQ defense as a paternalistic claim by employers.  For 
example, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Court 
rejected an employer’s refusal to employ women except those who 
proved their infertility where the job involved exposure to dangerous 
toxins that could endanger fetuses.13  Safety considerations are strongest 
when the safety objective pertains to third parties, while safety arguments 
about protecting the discriminated worker herself are often rejected as 
paternalism.  For example, several courts have refused to recognize 
paternalistic protection of women as a BFOQ gender discrimination defense 
to preclude women from serving as prison guards.14  Thus, when the 
targets of safety are third parties, courts have been more inclined to 
recognize the exception than when safety is cited vis-à-vis the excluded 
worker herself.  For prison guards and health aides, providing security 
and care to inmates and patients are essential job functions.  In contrast, 
in International Union the protection of the employee’s fertility and her 
unborn fetus was not part of the essence of the job and therefore did not 
fit into the BFOQ exceptions.15  All of these examples demonstrate that 
even within the easier cases of BFOQ, there is much debate about what 
circumstances qualify for the exception. 
In addition to privacy and safety, a third generally accepted category 
under BFOQ is that of authenticity.  The EEOC guidelines evoke an 
example of a theatre producer searching for a lead actress to play the 
heroine.16  Under such circumstances, the role need not be open to 
 11. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (permitting a prison to hire 
only men). 
 12. See supra note 10. 
 13. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 14. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. 
Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D. Or. 1983).  But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-
37 (1977) (finding a BFOQ exception for prison guards in inmate “contact” positions).
 15. Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 203-04. 
 16. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2). 




men.17  Likewise, for the purposes of authentic appearance as an ethnic 
restaurant, an owner of a sushi bar does not have to consider anyone who 
is not Japanese for the position of a chef, even if there are other qualified 
individuals who are as familiar with the art of sushi preparation.18  Even 
the legislative history of Title VII is concerned with the culinary experiences 
of the average American.  In the legislative discussions preceding the 
enactment of Title VII, participants stressed that the Act should not be 
interpreted to prevent the exclusive hiring of Italian nationals for the 
making of pizzas or French applicants for chef positions in French 
restaurants.19  These examples should quite readily raise some red flags 
about line drawing in the seemingly uncontroversial categories of BFOQ.  
First, the very idea that we should care about preferences for authentic 
artistic, dramatic, and culinary experiences seems to be value driven.  Of 
course, one could claim that these are customer preferences rather than 
court preferences.  Yet it is the court that assesses what type of 
preferences can be endorsed as part of a firm’s marketing strategy.  The 
legislature, the EEOC guidelines, and courts have endorsed experiential 
consumption as valuable, above and beyond the mere quality of the food 
in question.  In turn, they allow businesses to discriminate between job 
applicants on the basis of these experiential consumption preferences.  
Implicit in these discussions are choices about good life that include 
culinary satisfaction, artistic forms, and most controversially, the privileged 
value of cultural “preservation” and “genuine” ethnic production. 
BFOQ scholarly commentary considers these three categories of 
safety, privacy, and authenticity as relatively unproblematic compared to 
other customer preferences.  Nevertheless, the above examples show 
how these categories have required value driven judgments when applying 
the abstract exceptions to concrete facts.  The most controversial 
category, and the one that is of interest to Professor Yuracko, is that of 
customer preferences for one sex or the other, not for privacy, safety, or 
authenticity reasons, but rather because of aesthetic or affective reasons.  
Courts have generally rejected this residual category of preferences.  
Thus, gender and sexuality have not been accepted as essential to the 
business of marketing nonsexual services such as food and transportation.20  
Yuracko describes the exclusion of sexual titillation marketing from 
 17. See id.
 18. See, e.g., Employers May Hire on the Basis of Religion, Gender or National 
Origin in Certain Circumstances, EMPLOYMENT LAW BITS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://bwlaw. 
blogs.com/employment_law_bits/2005/11/index.html. 
 19. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2548-49 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3179-81 (1968).
 20. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
LOBEL.PRE_PDF_PAGES.DOC 2/26/2007  1:07:39 PM 
[VOL. 43:  899, 2006]  A Response to Kim Yuracko 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 905 
 
accepted BFOQ categories as presenting a puzzle to liberal models of 
equality.21  Puzzle indeed, but even within a liberal paradigm of equality, 
we can understand what judges are doing by adopting a more macro 
view of egalitarian justice.  In significant ways, the rejection of 
sexuality-based BFOQ presents a relatively easy case under liberal 
theory.  Allowing employers to argue a BFOQ defense when they are 
using only women for sexual titillation of their clients would fit 
precisely into the kind of behavior that coworker theory promises to 
prevent.  As Yuracko correctly acknowledges at the outset, within the 
liberal paradigm, employers are prohibited from treating men and 
women “who are in fact different, differently, if doing so will reinforce 
traditional status hierarchies.”22  Yet Yuracko states: 
It is difficult, however, to argue that courts’ prohibition on sex discrimination 
by sex-plus businesses is required by some formal conception of sex-blind 
equality.  In a meaningful sense, plus-sex employers are treating female and male 
applicants equally, subjecting both to the same set of hiring requirements.  It is 
simply the case that, depending upon whom the employer is trying to sexually 
arouse, individuals of one sex or the other are likely to be deemed unqualified.23
I disagree with the characterization of the “plus-sex” requirements as 
fitting squarely with a formal principle of sex-blind equality.24  Yuracko 
seems to accept a dialectic of two possible solutions promoted by the 
courts: desexualized workplaces and purely sexual business.  “[C]ourts 
force these businesses to abandon sexual titillation or alternatively adopt 
a more pure sex focus.”25  In effect, the dialectic characterizes the fact 
that women are hired for the sexual arousal of male clients in nonsexual 
contexts as simply a coincidence.  Yuracko fails to consider a third alternative 
of more equal “plus-sex” businesses.  Using perfectionism as her analytic 
frame, Yuracko accepts the problematic aspects of plus-sex business 
without advancing a counter vision of a fully integrated workforce in 
which sexual titillation would be equally performed.  I argue that a 
structural lens of occupational segregation provides a better analytic 
framework for analyzing the context of sexual marketing strategies.  The 
law’s concern about sex segregation—where women occupy sexy or 
 21. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 872-74. 
 22. Id. at 859. 
 23. Id. at 874.  
 24. I borrow the term plus-sex from Yuracko, referring to businesses that sell sex 
along with other goods and services.  Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: 
Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, supra note 5. 
 25. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874. 




pink collar jobs, while men occupy higher-paid business world jobs—
has guided courts to largely reject BFOQ claims in the category of 
sexual marketing. 
Consider a non-hierarchical gender equality world in which the 
consumption of sexy dressing is equally distributed.  In such a world, 
airlines, restaurants, hotel lobbies, and law firm reception halls would all 
include both men and women in skimpy sexy outfits to the enjoyment of 
diversely oriented clients.  Implicit in the rejection of women having the 
occupational quality of attracting business people to a particular airline 
is that if one could envision a gender egalitarian world, both women and 
men would have the purchasing power to trigger the marketing strategies 
of high-end consumption.  In the absence of gender hierarchy in social 
and economic relations—in a universe in which the consumption of sexy 
dressing were equally distributed—I predict that courts would have far 
less interest in scrutinizing businesses like Hooters when they claim 
BFOQ.26  By contrast, in reality courts categorize sexual marketing as 
licensing gender selective hiring because of deep insights into how 
gender and sexuality practically interact in our contemporary landscape 
to produce inequality.  Sexuality is not intrinsically threatening to 
workplace production, but rather it is the combination of unequal power 
and sexualization that produces discriminatory environments.  This 
combination is salient in the world of air travel.  When Pan Am presented 
empirical evidence that its customers preferred young female flight 
attendants, the court rejected this as establishing BFOQ.27  Women 
serving up sex as flight attendants reinforce a structure where men are 
assumed to have the higher-paid, higher-valued jobs of the business 
world traveler.  A major weakness in Yuracko’s argument is her all-too-
quick rejection of the coworker model in analyzing BFOQ distinctions: 
Courts’ prohibition on discrimination in these plus-sex cases is also difficult to 
explain by relying on a standard coworker principle.  Given the far greater demand 
for commodification and sale of female sexuality than male sexuality, allowing 
employers to define businesses as including explicit sexual titillation elements 
would, in all likelihood, lead to a wide range of jobs from which men but not women 
are excluded.  In other words, from a pure numbers perspective, the sexualization of 
mainstream jobs is likely to help rather than hurt women’s job prospects.28
 26. Miranda McGowan usefully pointed out that, in our current social environment, 
even when a small fraction of businesses cater to women customers in offering sexualized 
men, these enterprises, like Chippendales, receive a very different meaning in our contemporary 
culture than the male-oriented majority enterprises.  They are construed and understood 
as parodies or caricatures—unreal micro-performances imitating, without pretending to 
be, the real thing.  This is because everyone involved in the counter performance of 
sexual marketing understands that it is situated in a pervasive reverse reality world. 
 27. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 28. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874-75. 
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Here is the heart of the limitation in Yuracko’s analysis.  Yuracko 
neglects the danger of being disproportionately included in a particular 
position, not disproportionately excluded.  Again, without a macro view 
of job distribution in the labor market, it is easy to underplay the 
meaning of the micro facts of one airline’s marketing strategy.  In 
particular, Yuracko’s analysis collapses the various market perspectives, 
failing to account for the triangle of employer-employee-customer.  
Whose human flourishing are the judges advancing or not advancing 
when they accommodate customer preferences over an employee’s 
identity?  Part of the confusion stems from the fact that Yuracko adopts 
the customer’s perspective when explaining the cases of privacy and 
autonomy, while taking the perspective of the worker in the case of 
sexual arousal or titillation. 
In an important way, the questions posed to the court by 
antidiscrimination claims are always about choice and autonomy.  When 
one side in a private economic relationship demonstrates an identity-
based preference and another contests that preference, the court is 
authorized to adjudicate between these competing perspectives.  This is 
further complicated when there are three sides claiming a position on 
discriminatory preferences.  The employee-employer dichotomy shifts to 
a triangular set of interests, and the question becomes: Whose 
preferences is the firm privileging—those of its workers, or of its 
customers?  One of the indicators of a phenomenon worth protecting 
must be its robustness and its connections to other aspects of the labor 
market.  Today, numerous marketing strategies potentially fall into the 
plus-sex category.29  The flip side of catering to the expectations of 
customers is the signaling effect to the market that business men are the 
preferred customers that make the world go round.  If men fly around the 
world as occupiers of the higher paid, higher valued business world jobs, 
then women are those that occupy the role of the sexual flight attendant.  
My contention is that if these marketing strategies were not limited to 
the provision of female sexuality to male customers, the positions would 
become generally more valued.  However, under current labor market 
conditions, where the market is sexualized and segregated, sexual 
preferences are not the same as privacy preferences by customers.  This 
is because it is possible to make a claim for privacy in non-hierarchal 
 29. See, e.g., Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible 
Sex Discrimination, supra note 5, at 173-75. 




ways so that workers from both gender groups can be assigned each to 
their own gender while claims about sexual preferences by high- end 
male customers are likely to reinforce gender hierarchy.  A thicker 
understanding of the coworker model that takes a broader distributive 
justice approach fits well with liberal theory.  Put simply, the goal of 
employment discrimination policies is to promote women’s equality in 
the workforce, not in a particular sector or job.  Therefore, the cases of 
sexualizing non-sex work positions fit the coworker paradigm well.  
There is no need to turn to theories of perfectionism in order to explain 
why capabilities and choices are confined when women’s work is 
segregated to sexual and pink collar positions and tasks. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that courts have understood the risk 
of job segregation through gendered requirements not only in the context 
of sexual requirements but also in other gender codes.  For example, in a 
case that is not mentioned in Yuracko’s article, the court found gender 
discrimination at a hospital where women technicians were asked to 
wear uniforms that would associate them with nurses, while men were 
given uniforms that would associate them with doctors.30  Upholding the 
lower court decision striking down sex-specific dress codes for hospital 
technicians, the court stated that the dress requirements “were 
intentionally designed to reinforce sexual stereotypes: men were dressed 
to look like doctors, and women were dressed to look like nurses.”31  
Requiring women technicians to wear this specific uniform “implied 
they were of lower status than the male lab technicians[,] increas[ing] 
the psychological burden on the females.”32  While the case did not 
involve sexy dressing, it involved color-coded sexed dressing.  The 
analysis would not be complete without the immediate understanding 
that doctors and nurses are not equally regarded in the contemporary 
labor market.  Rather, there is social meaning encoded in the sex-based 
attire and grooming that corresponds to widespread occupational inequality. 
A liberal judge must understand the use of sexual codes as proxies for 
job segregation, prestige, and power whether the codes are sexy 
dressing, femininity, or makeup requirements.  Ironically, the judicial 
understanding that part of Hooters’ essence was to sell sexuality has 
recently proven to be a double-edged sword.  In a different context than 
Title VII, Hooters lost an intellectual property trade dress infringement 
claim in HI Limited Partnership (Hooters) v. Winghouse.33  The Eleventh 
Circuit upheld the Florida trial court’s decision that the “Hooters Girl” is 
 30. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Edward W. Sparrow Hosp. Ass’n, 377 N.W.2d 755, 
757, 764 (Mich. 1985).
 31. Id. at 764. 
 32. Id. at 757.
 33. 451 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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“the very essence of Hooters’ business,” whose “predominant function is 
to provide vicarious sexual recreation, to titillate, entice, and arouse 
male customers’ fantasies.”34  Therefore, the court deemed the skimpy 
Hooters outfit “primarily functional” and not subject to trademark 
protection.35  Even though the court recognized that the tank tops and 
running shorts of Hooters waitresses were distinctive enough to raise a 
trade dress claim under the Lanham Act, the outfit was not primarily 
nonfunctional.  Since the court understood the function of Hooters to be 
sexual titillation, it would not grant Hooters the competitive advantage 
of prohibiting other businesses from similarly adopting a sexual 
approach to the sale of hamburgers and hot wings.
Gender stereotyping is yet another example that can be analyzed in the 
context of coworker.  Here, Yuracko’s discussion of the PriceWaterhouse 
decision is more sensitive to the richness of the antidiscrimination 
analysis.  She recognizes that “[i]n a sexist society, nothing done by men 
and women has precisely the same meaning.  Traits are not understood 
or viewed as isolated technical attributes.  They are necessarily viewed 
in relation to all of the other traits an individual possesses and through a 
systematically gendered lens.”36  But in the context of sex stereotyping, 
Yuracko’s reading of courts’ reasoning is too benign.  She describes 
courts as valuing high paying, high status jobs that require rational 
reasoning and intellectual efforts, stereotypically masculine characteristics.  
Yuracko explores the story of Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff that was denied 
partnership at accounting firm PriceWaterhouse on the basis that she was 
too aggressive and not ladylike.37  Hopkins was often praised as “an 
outstanding professional” with a “strong character, independence, and 
integrity . . . extremely competent, intelligent, strong and forthright, very 
productive, energetic and creative.”38  Yet she was also “overly aggressive, 
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff.”39
 34. HI Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-59 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004); see also Posting of Ann Friedman to Feministing.com, http://feministing. 
com/archives/005278.html (June 25, 2006, 20:01 EST) (describing the decision as “[t]he 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirms a ruling that waitresses in tank tops and tiny 
track shorts are actual products, not symbols that can be trademarked.”). 
 35. HI Ltd. P’ship, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59. 
 36. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 889. 
 37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-35 (1989).
 38. Id. at 234. 
 39. Id. at 235. 




Although Yuracko acknowledges the problematic aspects of individual 
stereotyping that require compliance with an identity group, I believe it 
is also useful to connect PriceWaterhouse with broader recent developments 
in the nature of work itself.  Again, a more macro and structural orientation 
of employment patterns and occupational inequalities is necessary.  
Particularly in newer industries, where production is more relational than 
individuated, employers seek workers that can comply with “soft skill” 
requirements and engage in “emotional labor.”40  Arlie Hochschild defines 
emotional labor as work that “requires one to induce or suppress feeling 
in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper 
state of mind in others . . . .”41  Interpersonal skills include friendliness, 
teamwork, sociability, likeability, and the ability to fit in.  Soft skills also 
include motivational signals such as “enthusiasm, creativity, positive work 
attitude, morale, commitment, dependability, and willingness to learn.”42  
All of these qualities demand from workers appropriate affect, grooming, 
and attire.  Importantly, even in the most prestigious professional positions, 
emotional work is disproportionately delegated and expected of women.  
Therefore, in sex-stereotyping cases, similarly to BFOQ cases, the 
coding of feminine traits as part of work requirements are often held as 
disparate treatment prohibited by Title VII.  Indeed, I would suggest that 
the perfectionist ideals that Yuracko describes are themselves sexualized.  
Ideas such as rationality, objectivity, and reason, contrasted with irrationality, 
subjectivity, and emotionality, have been aligned with male/female values 
and, in turn, receive a hierarchical inscription in legal doctrine.  The 
commodification of certain behaviors and emotions and the exclusion of 
others, where gender is scripted and coded, reveals the discursive nature 
of sexuality.  Employee and customer preferences are themselves directed 
and reinforced by legal categories.  Thus, BFOQ and sex stereotyping 
cases can reinforce or eradicate preferences, according to the boundaries 
they draw between permitted and prohibited classifications.  Again, this 
reveals basic tensions that underlie the type of jurisprudence that 
Yuracko attempts to organize in a rather neat rubric of perfectionist 
decisionmaking. 
As a final comment, I suggest that the difficulties in delineating the 
BFOQ exceptions and the stereotyping contexts to prohibited discrimination 
underscore the general challenges of adjudicating equal opportunity 
 40. See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: 
Four Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 
166-67 (2001). 
 41. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART 7 (1983). 
 42. Lobel, supra note 40, at 178 (citing Philip Moss & Chriss Tilly, “Soft” Skills 
and Race: An Investigation of Black Men’s Employment Problems, 23 WORK & 
OCCUPATIONS 251, 256 (1996)). 
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rights in the workplace without a more active administrative scheme.43  I 
have shown elsewhere that the recent developments in the organization 
of work and production require a change in the ways we approach 
employment regulation.44  Here, I believe the dilemmas Yuracko highlights 
in her paper again support a reform that would expand the regulatory 
tools and strategies for effective workplace policy reforms.  In particular, 
Yuracko’s exploration of adjudicative puzzles suggests the importance 
of enhancing the EEOC’s role in enforcing Title VII. 
While the first decades of antidiscrimination litigation involved some 
of the most intentional and overt cases of discrimination, current forms 
of inequality are often more subtle and complex.  “As the workplace has 
become more dynamic and multifaceted, discriminatory practices are 
frequently not the result of a distinct and direct decision to discriminate 
but rather of complex practices, including corporate culture, informal 
norms, networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation.”45  These more 
subtle forms of gender discrimination simply require more than litigation 
and the declaration of a victim or perpetrator.  Rather, they require 
problem-solving efforts that engage employers and workers in ongoing, 
reflexive efforts to learn about the barriers of gender equity in the 
workplace.  Often, discrimination is the consequence of intragroup 
“horizontal” dynamics, rather than top-down managerial direction:46
A governance approach to discrimination thus changes the understanding of the 
nature and sources of discrimination.  Rather than seeing the worker as the victim 
and the employer as the conscious, malicious villain, it understands that 
discrimination is frequently the consequence of processes and structures that 
can be transformed through learning and mutual engagement.47
The difficulty in discerning the coworker effects from other market 
practices reveals the limits of Title VII litigation, which delineates 
business practices as either allowed or prohibited—an on-off tool based 
on the configuration of clear lines between discriminators and the 
 43. For arguments about the limitations of rights claiming absent a more 
developed regulatory framework, see generally Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in 
Labour Market Policies, supra note 6. 
 44. See Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2146 (2003). 
 45. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004) (citing 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001)). 
 46. See Lobel, supra note 40, at 173-74. 
 47. Lobel, supra note 45, at 421. 




victims of discrimination.  In recent years, many commentators have 
pointed out the limits of Title VII in changing the realities of gender 
discrimination in the contemporary workplace.48  Because they are 
entrusted with merely one case at a time, courts are necessarily limited in 
their perspective of workplace justice.  In any given case, they are observing 
a single workplace rather than a sector at large, regional production 
patterns, or developments across industries.  In order to understand the 
market effects of segregated jobs, courts must analyze not only the 
particular workplace before them, but also information about the 
composition of clients, statistical changes in the workforce at large, and 
the comparative conditions of employees in various positions in the 
industry.  In short, courts need to take a broad view of the market in 
order to understand patterns of gender subordination. 
A richer, more nuanced understanding of the causes and effects of 
discrimination fits well with a more active role for the EEOC.  This is 
particularly true in light of private market efforts in “diversity 
management.”49  Increasingly, firms are adopting internal compliance 
structures to promote diversity in the workplace, including codes of ethics, 
focus groups, internal grievance procedures, and training programs.50  I 
have been a cautiously optimistic commentator on the move away from 
a sole focus on “command-and-control” to an increased focus on ex ante 
cooperative prevention, mandated corporate self-regulation, and “beyond 
compliance” programs.51  But the caution remains simple: All compliance 
programs are not created equal and voluntary programs can never be the 
only means of preventing illegal behavior in complex organizations.  
The key is to distinguish between effective approaches that support the 
goals of the policies and those approaches that are merely cosmetic—an 
 48. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and 
Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 2370 (1994); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of 
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 396 (2005); Lobel, supra note 45, at 419-23; 
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 610-14 (2001); 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001). 
 49. Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity 
Management: Employer Response to Anti-Discrimination Law 1961-1996, 41 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 964-66 (1998). 
 50. Id.; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute 
for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and 
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 
(2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s limitation of liability for employers who utilize 
antidiscrimination training). 
 51. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 498, 507-08 (2004). 
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evasion or a liability shield by means of symbolic attention.52  Yet the 
EEOC has not been significantly involved in the design or evaluation of 
these programs.  The EEOC has only recently adopted policies that 
promote ongoing communication among advocacy groups, community 
organizations, industry representatives, and worker representatives.53  By 
and large, the agency has not studied the effects of voluntary industry 
programs and remains generally passive in its practices. 
Unlike other administrative agencies, the EEOC was set up as a weak 
regulatory agency that lacks rulemaking power.  Rather than promulgate 
rules, the agency issues nonbinding guidelines, conducts investigations, 
and impacts litigation.  Consequently, EEOC guidelines are afforded less 
deference than the rules issued by other federal agencies.54  Taking a 
comparative perspective from across the Atlantic, this is a fairly limited 
role for the agency entrusted with the task of the promotion of workplace 
equality.  For instance, unlike the American EEOC, the British Equal 
Opportunities Commission has both investigative and rulemaking 
powers.55  It also received greater administrative enforcement powers 
and is designed to study the market, collect information, and promote 
industry-wide change.56  Unlike courts that are best situated for the 
correction of past wrongs in individual cases, agencies are better situated 
to take a broader approach of distributive justice and future change.  
Understanding the complex ways discrimination operates supports this 
broader approach to law and social change and points to the advantage 
of a legal process, rather than a merely court-oriented perspective.57
 
      52.     See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 53. See Sturm, supra note 48, at 552-53 & n.345; see also Lobel, supra note 45, at 
422-23. 
 54. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (“In the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the 
U.S. Supreme Court often prefers to ‘chart its own course’ rather than to defer to Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . regulations and guidance interpreting these 
laws.”).
 55. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c. 65, § 67 (Eng.); see also Julie Chi-hye Suk, 
Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 447.
 56. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, § 67; see also Suk, supra note 55. 
 57. For further discussion, see generally Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in 
Labour Market Policies, supra note 6. 




III.  REGULATION OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE PRIVATE MARKET 
Having argued that much of the puzzle of BFOQ and stereotyping 
categories in Title VII cases can be settled by using the lens of liberal 
theories of equality, I now turn to examine other sets of values that are in 
play in Title VII adjudication.  Here, I agree with Yuracko’s claim that 
gender equality concerns are not all that feeds into the adjudicative 
process.58  Yuracko focuses on the regulation of sexual behavior in the 
workplace as it unfolds in subcategories of antidiscrimination litigation.  
However, the regulation of workplace sexuality extends far beyond these 
cases to a wide array of social facts and legal doctrine.  These contexts 
include workplace harassment, workplace dating policies, employee 
privacy and autonomy, speech and political activity, and even contexts 
outside of the workplace such as explaining consent in sexual relations.  
Together these contexts present a map of sex jurisprudence as a unique 
affair in our society.  Sex is pervasively institutionalized through regulation 
and, in turn, the regulation of sexual behavior profoundly affects the ways 
we understand sexual behaviors, sexual taboos, and sexual meaning.59  
Situating the question of Title VII litigation in this broader scheme of 
sexuality at work, it becomes clear that the law simultaneously prohibits 
and allows the eroticization of the workplace.  The regulation of sexuality 
therefore presents a unique context of social behavior codification as law 
and power intertwine. 
Yuracko finds perfectionist ideals to be the driving force behind many 
of the legal impulses to restrict sexuality at work.60  I suggest a far more 
complex, and often less benign, description of the non-commodification 
impulse of judges.  I urge an analysis that includes the ways sexuality 
has been historically configured as a threat to private market production.  
Even though Yuracko describes cases where employers develop 
requirements to induce sexuality in commercial contexts,61 sexuality at 
work is frequently understood as a threat to order.  As Yuracko describes, 
plus-sex commerce can be a money-making endeavor.62  But industry 
also frequently treats sexuality in the workplace as a money-losing 
combination.63  The perception of sexuality as a threat to market production 
 58. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 862. 
 59. For a provocative inquiry on how legal fields, including First Amendment, 
broadcast regulation, sexual harassment, and education law interact with cultural taboos 
pertaining to the use of sexual terms, see Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, Center for 
Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 59 (2006). 
 60. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874. 
 61. Id. at 872-80. 
 62. Id. at 873. 
 63. Id. at 880-83. 
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has led to strange alliances between feminist theorists, puritanical ideologists, 
and managerial capitalists. 
Noticeably, there has been far greater public acceptance of the 
regulation of sexual behavior than of other aspects of the workplace.  
For example, sexual harassment is a far more studied and discussed topic 
than occupational risk regulation.64  Human resource administrators, 
managers, and in-house counsel are all too enthusiastic in jumping on the 
wagon of desexualizing the workplace.  Indeed, there is a long history of 
private (and more recently, public) regulation of sexual conduct in industrial 
relations.  The idea that sexuality in the workplace should be contained, 
controlled, and to the extent possible, eliminated, does not simply fit 
certain perfectionist ideals but also fits neatly with modern managerial 
schools of thought.  When judges reject a sexualized workplace, they are 
occasionally passing judgment on the ways in which cognitive labor is 
better than manual labor.  Yuracko correctly reads some decisions as 
motivated by the idea that a rational, intellectual being has a better life 
than a sexual or physical being.65  Surely, it is possible that some of the 
cases discussed by Yuracko would be endorsed by leading perfectionist 
theorists such as Thomas Hurka, George Sher, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Peggy Radin.66  But interestingly, the model of separating sexuality from 
industrial production also fits well with Frederick Taylor, Henry Ford, 
and a line of contemporary management theorists.67  Strikingly, from a 
market perspective, a majority of businesses still understand sexuality as a 
threat.68  Like in other spheres of life, sex in the marketplace presents 
dangers.  Intimacy and sexual expression at work are understood to threaten 
productivity and reduce efficiency.  In particular, female sexuality and any 
form of deviant sexuality risks chaos and the unleashing of resistance 
and non-submissiveness.69
Examples of corporate regulation of sexuality and intimacy include 
restrictions on dating,70 dress and grooming requirements,71 and intense 
 64. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The 
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1128 (2005), for a discussion 
of the thinness of public debates in the context of occupational safety. 
 65. Id. at 880. 
 66. Id. at 864-66. 
 67. See Lobel, supra note 40, at 144-45; Schultz, supra note 7, at 2064. 
 68. Schultz, supra note 7, at 2090-92. 
 69. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley 
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976); ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF 
THE CORPORATION (2d ed. 1993).
 70. Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1994) (dismissing 




monitoring of “proper” sexual interaction, revealed through the mushrooming 
of sexual harassment training programs.72  Corporate headquarters have 
been curiously enthusiastic about implementing sexual harassment training 
programs, exhibiting a fetish-like eagerness to resolve sex tensions 
through an hour long catch-all session on how not to behave.  In fact, 
businesses have gone above and beyond what courts have actually defined 
as sexual harassment.73  Employee handbooks, company manuals, and 
sexual harassment training frequently prohibit behavior that would not 
be considered sexual harassment, such as interacting with a coworker in 
social contexts, commenting on a new blouse, or hugging a colleague.  
One popular commercial PowerPoint template designed for corporate 
sexual harassment training gives the example of a man and a woman 
dining.74  The manual explains that even though inviting a woman supervisee 
or coworker to share a meal “is not harassment[,] . . . it’s still not a good 
idea.”75  Courts, legislators and administrators have been equally enthusiastic 
about these programs.  In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has 
used discrimination training and internal compliance procedures as an 
employer’s defense against sexual harassment claims.76  Antidiscrimination 
training by corporate headquarters has also been recognized as a way of 
reducing damages and reaching settlements in existing cases.77  Even 
more recently, the state of California passed a law that every workplace 
with fifty or more employees must provide two hours of sexual harassment 
training and education to all supervisory employees at least once every 
a wrongful termination claim of an employee dating, and subsequently marrying, a 
coworker); Rulon-Miller v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (holding wrongful termination in the dismissal of an employee for dating an 
employee of a competitor); Roberto Ceinceros, Some Employers Using Contracts to Cut 
Romance Risks, 32 BUS. INS. 3 (1998), available at  http://www.businessinsurance.com/ 
(subscriber only) (discussing use of “love contracts” to help companies thwart sexual 
harassment lawsuits); Mark Hansen, Love’s Labor Laws: Novel Ways to Deal with Office 
Romance After the Thrill Is Gone, 84 A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (1998) (describing how 
corporations are adopting policies on dating and encouraging dating employees to sign 
“consensual relationship agreements”).
 71. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992); Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A 
Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982).
 72. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable 
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 154-55 (2001).
 73. See Schultz, supra note 7, at 2064.  
 74. BUSINESS AND LEGAL REPORTS, INC., CALIFORNIA GUIDE TO PREVENTING 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 14.   
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
 77. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 50, at 3. 
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two years.78  In turn, the multibillion dollar industry of practitioners 
providing compliance training is flourishing, marketing audio, video, 
computer, or Web-based training and seminars.79
These developments in fact fit well with the series of cases of sex 
stereotyping and sexual titillation that Yuracko identifies in her paper.  If 
corporations can control the grooming and dress codes of their employees, 
gender norms continue to be shaped by unequal social and market 
relations.  Moreover, the focus on the regulation of sexuality arguably 
diverts attention and resources from other issues of workplace justice.  
In other words, the “sexiness” of the topic of sexuality overshadows 
other questions of fairness and justice.  Vicki Schultz has been a leading 
commentator on the ways the focus on regulating sexual conduct at work 
has been at odds with the broader project of occupational gender equity.  
In her article, The Sanitized Workplace, Schultz argues that “the attempt 
to banish sexuality from the workplace threatens many important social 
interests.”80  Schultz argues that a feminist discourse has been subsumed 
by the neo-Taylorist project of regulating sexuality in the workplace.  
Human resource managers eagerly suppress any indication of sexual 
energy and intimacy in their ranks: 
It wasn’t Victorian churchwomen, but twentieth-century organization men who 
took the lead in creating the asexual imperative: men like Frederick Winslow 
Taylor, who saw managers as rational “heads” who would control the unruly 
“hands” and irrational “hearts” of those who assumed their places as workers in 
the modern organization.  Although the necessity of bureaucratic organization 
has come under challenge in recent years, the drive toward asexuality is not 
fading along with it.  Today, as much as ever, sexuality is seen as something 
“bad”—or at least beyond the bounds of professionalism—that should be 
banished from organizational life.  If sexuality cannot be banished entirely, then 
those who embody or display it must be brought under tight control and 
subjected to discipline.81
While Schultz envisions an integrated workplace benefiting from 
liberating sexual expressions, she also recognizes that in the context of 
job segregation sexual expression assumes a different social meaning.  
In a sex segregated market, all supervisors are men and all supervisees 
are women, or, as in our previous discussion, all high-end business 
 78. California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, Modified Proposed 
Regulations on Harassment Training and Education, http://www.fehc.ca.gov/pdf/ 
modified_6-20-06.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
 79. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 50, at 16. 
 80. Schultz, supra note 7, at 2067. 
 81. Id. at 2064.




customers are men and low-end service workers are women.  Rather 
than simply supporting non-commodification of the ideals of love and 
sex, in a segregated labor market sexual regulation becomes one, but not 
the only, expression of gender subordination. 
Most disturbingly, the focus on sexual behavior as the dominant form 
of gender discrimination has stunted a more robust idea of workplace 
justice.  De-sexing the workplace allows employers control over various 
aspects of work and at the same time leaves intact other forms of less 
explicit gender hierarchy in the workplace.  As in former eras, 
contemporary culture has internalized the idea that sexuality does not fit 
well with the public sphere.  In turn, active separation between private 
and public aspects of workers contributes to the idea of separation 
between spheres, such as the private essence of childrearing.82  The 
creation of public/private distinctions in relation to care work, paid, and 
unpaid work remain the background legal rules, exacerbating the 
conditions of gender hierarchy in workplace without a direct or salient 
intervention in contractual relations.  It is thus easier, or in a way safer, 
for private industry as well as for courts, to identify discrimination in 
sexually explicit activities, because this focus narrows the field of 
inquiry.  It excludes deeper inquiries on distributive justice, pay equity, 
family responsibility rights, and firm decisionmaking structures.  Again, 
this also reveals the limitations of turning to courts for antidiscrimination 
workplace reform.  The anomaly of Title VII and identity based claims 
as the primary focus of workplace advocacy should be questioned when 
contrasted with a comprehensive vision of workplace equity.  Currently, 
so much of the discourse on distributive justice is funneled into claims 
about workplace discrimination that discussions of workplace reform are 
exceedingly narrow.83  It is a classic example of a statute that expected 
to do too much, and in turn achieves too little. 
Finally, my arguments about sexual regulation relate to the question of 
egalitarian reform in the face of pervasive inequities.  The fact that there 
are multiple values that affect the regulation of sexuality in the 
workplace offers an opportunity for a women’s agency to construct the 
meanings of sexuality in non-egalitarian environments.  When there is 
enough play in the social meanings of enhancing or suppressing 
sexuality at work, “[a] single item of clothing might evoke any of these 
or countless other narratives, each suggesting further plot details: the 
 82. Frances E. Olsen,The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
 83. See Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1551-
52 (2006). 
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deflowered virgin, the aroused sex slave, the dominatrix.”84  One of the 
greatest challenges for feminist legal theorists has been to articulate a 
theory of female agency in the face of pervasive male dominance.  
Feminist theorists like Mary Jo Frug, Kathryn Abrams, and Judith Butler 
have argued that patriarchy constructs both male and female sexuality 
from a particular male-oriented perspective, so that both men and 
women experience sexuality through male domination.85  For example, 
dress codes that require men to wear a tuxedo and women to wear small, 
sexy dresses perpetuate patriarchal ideas of gender roles and hierarchy.  
Sexuality, as has been discussed in the preceding Parts, becomes a 
pervasive form of discipline.86  Sexy dressing requirements become a 
script which encodes the norms of our society, and female sexy dressing 
requirements signify “the eroticization of domination.”87
If patriarchy is a pervasive reality for all, it is inevitable that women 
internalize male aesthetics and gender-coded norms.  This has led some 
commentators to an impasse.  Duncan Kennedy has described the 
“conventional view” that understands sexy dressing as the trigger for 
sexual abuse (“the woman asked for it”) and the “radical feminist view” 
that understands sexual subordination as the cause for sexy dressing, 
since women have little impact over society’s eroticization of women’s 
subordination.88  In this case, how can women resist patriarchy from 
within?  How can they re-imagine gender roles in a way that is empowering 
and can create change?  Within this bind, however, Kennedy describes a 
third possibility that emphasizes women’s agency within an unequal 
society: “Women, who have no choice but to dress somehow within this 
system of contending normativities, and their male and female audience, 
 84. Naomi Mezey, Legal Radicals in Madonna’s Closet: The Influence of Identity 
Politics, Popular Culture, and a New Generation on Critical Legal Studies, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1835, 1850 (1994). 
 85. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY 
DRESSING ETC. 127 (1993); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); 
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female 
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994); Laura T. Kessler, Is There Agency in 
Dependency? Expanding the Feminist Justifications for Restructuring Wage Work, in 
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS 373-99 (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
 86. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 69. 
 87. KENNEDY, supra note 85, at 127. 
 88. See id. 




act neither as mere tools of patriarchy nor as the autonomous subjects of 
liberal theory.”89
Indeed, recent feminist critiques have resisted the modernist notion 
that sexy dressing simply represents the end result of social patriarchy 
and inequality.90  Feminist thinkers are increasingly exploring the ways 
sexy dressing can be transformative, empowering, and a site of action 
rather than simply a site of reaction.  Patriarchal scripts and images may 
be subverted through reinterpretation.91  In the context of the regulation 
of sexuality at work, this may suggest the advantage of generating 
alternative gender norms that reject the order in which management is so 
invested. 
IV.  LIBERALISM IN PLAY: MACRO CONTRADICTIONS AND MICRO 
VALUE JUDGMENTS IN ADJUDICATION 
While Yuracko explores the ways perfectionist ideals creep into 
adjudicative action in the context of Title VII claims, I suggest 
antidiscrimination litigation should be understood as one among many 
examples of an inevitable “liberalism-plus-perfectionism” impulse that 
guides liberal judges.  Because of pervasive tensions within liberal 
commitments in action, judges regularly engage in value-driven 
judgment in implementing the high orders of liberal rights in concrete 
cases.  Moreover, as we expand the inquiry of the internal incoherence in 
liberal adjudication, we again encounter the ways in which Yuracko 
overstates the internal coherence of alternative world views that may 
explain judicial decisionmaking. 
Because of the competing demands that liberal rights present in 
concrete policy contexts, judges cannot remain neutral in evaluating 
various human activities that are configured through law.  One of the 
primary functions of law is to stabilize expectations and increase 
certainty.  The idea that our current analytic frames are unsatisfactory for 
line drawing in concrete cases is an uncomfortable one for many 
thinkers.  In former eras, legal formalism protected against the salience 
of political choices that must be made in the application of rules to facts.  
Today, scholars like Yuracko turn to ideals and principles beyond those 
of liberalism to suggest more coherence in the adjudicative process.  
Importantly, liberal theorists themselves often comprehend rights only 
 89. Id. at 128-29 (referring to this next step in feminist thinking as “pro-sex 
feminist postmodernism”). 
 90. See, e.g., Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, supra note 85, at 339.  
 91. See Zipporah Wiseman et al., Is Subversion Subversive?, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & 
L. 149 (2003).
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by reference to normative values, such as plurality, choice, autonomy, 
and human flourishing.92
Turning to the perspective of historical labor market reforms reveals 
that the creeping of perfectionist beliefs into a seemingly liberal legalistic 
frame of individual freedoms is not unique to the context of sex 
discrimination.  Indeed, because of the conflicting values that liberalism 
itself embodies, judges regularly refer to their beliefs of good life in 
order to mediate these tensions.  Here, I offer very briefly, and with a 
very broad brush, some examples of these tensions.  One example is the 
way associational rights, freedom of speech, freedom of contract, and 
property rights have played out in industrial relations and labor law.  
Historically, the normative pull of a “right” and a “freedom” has been 
used both by supporters of protective labor market policies and those 
who resisted them.  Courts have cited the constitutional freedoms of 
association and speech both for the purpose of prohibiting and for 
protecting labor organization.93  Judges have cited to the idea of freedom 
of contract and property both to strike down protective employment 
legislation and to create common law employment protections.94  
Famously, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York 
law prohibiting bakers from working more than sixty hours per week.95  
The Lochner court declared: “The right to purchase or to sell labor is 
part of the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth] amendment, unless there 
are circumstances which exclude the right.”96  Lochner was only one of 
 92. See generally Peter de Marneffe, Liberalism and Perfectionism, 43 AM. J. 
JURIS. 99 (1998) (discussing “perfectionist liberalism”).
 93. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding a law 
prohibiting teachers belonging to certain associations unconstitutional); Dorchy v. 
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926) (holding Kansas statute rendering it a crime to induce 
another to commit a labor strike constitutional); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated 
Woodworkers’ Local Union No. 131, 75 N.E. 877, 879-81 (1905) (holding that workers 
have a right to strike as their “fundamental” right to a “free and equal chance”).  For 
further discussion, see James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 
941 (1999); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 
996-1002 (1997).
 94. It is instructive to compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), and 
the 1938 enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060.  
See generally Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1541 (2002) (book review); Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care 
of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1393 (2005).
 95. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
 96. Id. at 53. 




many decisions between 1905 and 1935 where contract and property 
rights were used to justify striking down laws pertaining to worker 
health and safety as well as collective bargaining and union membership.  
Courts granted injunctions against labor strikes and struck down laws 
making it a crime to fire an employee because of union membership, 
grounding these decisions on liberal constitutional rights.97
The same ideas of liberties and rights served the New Deal 
government in adopting a very different approach to market regulation.  
At the same time the economy was experiencing upheaval and scarcities, 
the idea that a “right” mandated particular distributional results was 
increasingly destabilized.  The legal realists showed how property rights 
were in effect a bundle of relationships between differently situated 
people with different interests, rather than a unified object.98  In 1935, 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted as a complete 
reordering of work relations.99  During the same period, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act was enacted, mandating a federal minimum wage and 
overtime compensation even in the context of individual employment.  
But the debates about what liberalism mandated in the context of work 
relations remained ever controversial.  For example, the NLRA, designed to 
provide associational rights for workers seeking to unionize, also 
protects the right of individual workers not to join unions.100  The 
concept of a “right to work,” largely embraced in the international arena 
 97. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553-61 (1923) (employing 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate a minimum wage law for 
women because it was not closely related to regulating the public interest, health, or 
morals); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (using the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause to invalidate a law barring employers from forbidding their 
employees to join unions); State v. Legendre, 70 So. 70, 71 (La. 1915) (invalidating a 
limitation on firemen’s working hours under the Louisiana Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution).  Moreover, from 1880 to 1930, state and federal courts issued roughly 
4300 antistrike decrees.  THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 490 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992). 
 98.  Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in 
the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 
1141 (1938); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870-1960 (1992); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” 
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
 99. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
157-69 (2000)).
 100. “[T]he NLRA lent itself to conflicting policy aims; on the one hand, the ends 
of wealth redistribution and increased consumer demand required worker solidarity, 
while on the other hand, the goal of individual liberty respected the workers’ decision to 
join a company union or no union.”  Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception 
of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and 
the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 107 (2005).
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and numerous liberal constitutions as requiring a legal process to 
promote the human capacity to act in the labor market, has been 
interpreted in many American state laws as an anti-union law.101  By 
1947, over a dozen states passed “right to work” laws, which outlawed 
union security clauses and were designed to curtail the ability of unions 
to expand membership through closed shop requirements for newly 
hired workers.102  The fact that profoundly opposing political projects 
appropriated the very same liberal discourse indicates some of the 
complexities in adjudicating rights.  In all of these contexts, because rights 
in the abstract represent bundles of competing commitments and 
protections, they cannot be applied without reference to “liberalism-plus” 
or “plus-perfectionism” moral ordering.  Without broader, richer visions 
of social interactions and judgment about activities worth protecting, 
judges have few independent variables on which they can rely when 
adjudicating competing claims of individuals and groups. 
Other, more micro examples of a judicial turn to normative evaluation 
from the workplace context include the common law developed exceptions 
to at-will employment.  These exceptions range from tort exceptions of 
public policy wrongful discharge, employee privacy rights, the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lastly, to the myriad of 
antidiscrimination and identity accommodation policies which are the 
focus of this symposium.  Importantly, perfectionist hierarchies between 
body and mind capacities are pervasive in employment law in general, 
not simply in workplace discrimination law.  An illuminating case is 
Wilson v. Monarch, in which a sixty-year-old vice president, who was an 
at-will employee, was demoted to an entry level warehouse supervisor 
with “menial and demeaning duties, including sweeping up and cleaning 
the warehouse cafeteria.”103  While the employer could have legally fired 
the plaintiff, it was held liable for the demotion.  The Fifth Circuit found 
the employer’s conduct “so outrageous that civilized society should not 
tolerate it.”104  Professor Alan Hyde contemplates some obvious questions 
in reaction to this decision: “[W]ho swept up and cleaned the cafeteria 
before Wilson?  Was that intentional infliction of emotional distress?”105  
 101. See GILBERT GALL, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT TO WORK, 1943-1979, at 19 (1988).
 102. See id. at 230-31.
 103. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 189 (2002) (citing Wilson v. 
Monarch, 939 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 104. Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145. 
 105. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 103, at 189. 




The case law is saturated with examples where simple mistreatment is 
not considered emotionally abusive and would not qualify for a tort 
claim, like hiring a janitor to work in very difficult and unsafe conditions 
with extremely low pay.  Yet in Wilson, the move from white collar to 
blue collar work was viewed by the court as demeaning and, thereby, 
illegal.106  Regina Austin, writing about the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, invites us to imagine a different tort—a generic 
tort of humiliation in work relations: 
Whereas the law assumes that abuse is utilized because workers are not 
contributing to the enterprise as they should be, workers view abuse as a 
calculated devaluation of themselves and their work. . . .  [Interviewed 
employees] especially objected to being asked to do “menial” domestic chores 
because it meant that their employers did not take them seriously with regard to 
the tasks they were hired to perform.107
Austin’s imagined tort is clearly not recognized in modern 
employment law.  Rather, “[c]ourts see toughness and strength as such 
positive attributes that they simply assume that the capacity to tolerate 
abuse, and the propriety of dishing it out, vary with the nature of work, 
the workplace, and the characteristics of the workers.”108  Moreover, the 
conditions of acceptable hardship vary in adjudicative decisionmaking 
along class and gender lines.  According to Austin, “[m]ales and blue-
collar workers, for example, may be subjected to harsher supervision 
than females or white-collar workers because of the acceptability of sex 
and class distinctions and the implications of group pride that underlie 
the disparate treatment.”109  This “tolerated residuum”110 once again points 
to the unstable interpretation of decency in employment relations as they 
relate to our world views on human development and flourishing.  In the 
 106. See Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145.  Another example involves the distinction 
between “high culture” and “low culture” in freedom of speech jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 
1935, 1979 (1995) (book review) (discussing author Cass R. Sunstein’s divide between 
high culture, which supports democracy, and low culture, which erodes it).  Yet another 
example involves the ever shifting line between professional employees and non-
professional employees for the purposes of employment and labor laws, such as the 
FLSA and the NLRA.  See generally John C. Duncan, Jr., The Indentured Servants of 
Academia: The Adjunct Faculty Dilemma and Their Limited Legal Remedies, 74 IND. 
L.J. 513 (1998); Allison E. McClure, Comment, The Professional Presumption: Do 
Professional Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter into 
Employment-Related Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497 (2006); David M. 
Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional 
Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990). 
 107. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1988). 
 108. Id. at 18. 
 109. Id. 
 110. KENNEDY, supra note 85, at 137. 
LOBEL.PRE_PDF_PAGES.DOC 2/26/2007  1:07:39 PM 
[VOL. 43:  899, 2006]  A Response to Kim Yuracko 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 925 
 
end, the most interesting questions are about the particular constellations 
resulting from the competing stances intertwined in the adjudicative 
process. 
Finally, in the field of antidiscrimination policies, it is important to 
remember that Yuracko’s paper tackles aspects of the most conforming 
standard within Title VII litigation—disparate treatment.  As her paper 
and our discussion here clarifies, the disparate treatment model itself as 
developed in the case law cannot be explained solely by the liberal 
principle of value neutral promotion of equality.  Even more challenging 
are those models that move beyond direct individual acts of discrimination 
to the prohibition on disparately impacting work qualifications and 
requirements of accommodation.  None of these models fit neatly into the 
gender-blind paradigm of sameness.  In deciding the reasonableness of 
accommodating disabilities or the relevance of certain job qualifications, for 
example, pervasive indeterminacy of categories of sameness or difference 
and freedom or coercion mandates the introduction of richer world 
views.  As discussed above, perfectionist ideals of human development 
often assign privilege to emotional and intellectual endeavors over 
physical or menial work.  However, in some contexts, there is a flip.  For 
example, in the case of worker autonomy, privacy, and the establishment 
of harassment claims, workers who experience a physical invasion are 
much more likely to prevail in their claims than when the interference is 
less tangible and the intrusion is non-physical.  Thus, even perfectionism 
gets turned on its head when it is called to service by practical dilemmas. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Yuracko’s paper tries to straddle inconsistencies in the 
grand theory of liberalism by relying on a grand alternative theory of 
perfectionism.  This leaves unsatisfactory answers to profound 
debates within liberalism and the legal system.  Put crudely, Yuracko 
offers too neat an explanation of too few questions about liberal theory 
and adjudication.  The last sections of Yuracko’s article are the most direct 
retreat from the full conclusion to which her analysis should have led.  
Reaching the end of her essay, Yuracko contends, “[c]ertainly most 
antidiscrimination demands are consistent with standard liberal 
principle. . . .”111  In conclusion, she stresses, “I have focused in this 
paper on the areas of law in which standard equality and coworker 
 111. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 896. 




arguments are at their most indeterminate and incoherent.  “It is in these 
areas that the role of perfectionism can be seen most clearly.”112  There 
is no doubt that in some areas the existence of value-driven judgments is 
more salient than in other areas.  Yet the critical lesson from the exploration 
of the recent antidiscrimination cases is that even in those areas that are 
considered easy, distinctions are not fixed and conflicts do not result in a 
stable resolution.  Judicial understandings of the core liberal circle and 
the outer circle of plus-perfectionism are constantly evolving. 
 
 112. Id.  
